University of Miami Law School

Institutional Repository
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review

4-1-2013

Market Price, Social Price, and the Right to the
City: Land Taxes and Rates for City Services in
Brazil and the United States
Alan M. White

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Alan M. White, Market Price, Social Price, and the Right to the City: Land Taxes and Rates for City Services in Brazil and the United States,
44 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 313 (2013)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol44/iss2/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami InterAmerican Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.

\\jciprod01\productn\I\IAL\44-2\IAL209.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

1-NOV-13

13:41

313

Market Price, Social Price, and the Right to
the City: Land Taxes and Rates for City
Services in Brazil and the
United States
Alan M. White1
ABSTRACT
Brazil’s 1988 Constitution and 2001 City Statute explicitly
adopt the concept of a right to the city articulated by French philosopher Henri Lefebvre. As residents of Rio de Janeiro’s informal
self-constructed communities achieve success in their struggle for
legalization and citizenship, they are confronted with the high
market price of property ownership. Willing to pay for city services according to their ability, they argue for a social price, rather
than a market price, for city services, to prevent their inevitable
displacement. While Brazil has the legal tools in place, it is
unclear whether, and if so how, the idea of a social price will take
hold for residents of newly “regularized” settlements. The city and
state have responded to the argument for a social price with a
variety of measures, hesitating between a true social price and the
imperatives of the market. In the United States, cities have grappled, on an informal and largely ad hoc basis, with the social-price
issue. A variety of tax abatements, transfers, and utility rate programs exist at the state and municipal government level to
address the reality that market pricing of city services will drive
the poor out of the city center, where their labor and social communities are either needed or at least tolerated. While the concept
of a right to the city, and of social pricing, are foreign to United
States law and the neoliberal consensus, the catalog of these programs reveals a certain recognition of an inchoate right to an
affordable city, in continual opposition to the rules of the market.
1. Professor of Law, CUNY School of Law, Queens, New York. The author would
like to acknowledge substantial research assistance from Anne Zygaldo at Valparaiso
Law School and Carlos Borborema at Fundação Getulio Vargas. Thanks also to Colin
Crawford, Romulo Sampaio and Maria Clara Dias, and their student assistants, for
organizing the 2010 Study Space V workshops in Rio de Janeiro and the subsequent
publications, as well as to Shu-Yi Oei, Saru Matambanadzo, Stacy Seichshnaydre and
the Tulane workshop participants, and to the workshop participants at the 2011 Law
and Society conference for helpful comments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many of the poor in Brazil’s cities, like those all over Latin
America and the global South, have lived for decades in self-constructed housing without legal property rights or recognition.
After facing slum clearance and forced relocation programs for
much of the twentieth century, slum dwellers have recently
achieved some incorporation into the legal city, with its network of
city services, and the beginning of a legal recognition of their occupancy through title-granting programs.2 But on the day the
favela3 resident receives her new deed, she is also faced with the
bill for her new citizenship. With ownership comes the problem of
paying property taxes, utility rates and all the other charges that
come with a title deed and an address. Thus does the formalization and legalization process, intended to remedy social exclusion,
produce a more ruthless form of exclusion by market pricing of the
city.4 Residents of informal communities yearn for the citizenship
that the tax bill represents, but militate also for a social price5
that recognizes the unequal wages that the urban economy pays
them.
Although not identified as such, social pricing for taxes and
municipal services, including water and energy rates, exist in
various forms in both Brazil and the United States. Various
explicit legislative enactments or administrative practices depart
from the market logic that market pricing should determine what
city residents should pay for city services. These laws and practices seem to have emerged in response to various political mobilizations and from concern of political leaders and administrators to
mitigate the harsh triage that pure market pricing imposes on citizens of the city.
After introducing the right to the city and its incorporation
into Brazil’s legal texts, I will discuss the social pricing practices
of Brazilian cities and municipal service providers, and then turn
to the corresponding practices in United States cities. While the
2. EDESIO FERNANDES, REGULARIZATION OF INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS IN LATIN
AMERICA (Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol. 2011).
3. Favela is the term generally used to identify shantytowns in Rio de Janeiro
and in Brazil generally. Ney dos Santos Oliveira, Favelas and Ghettos: Race and
Class in Rio de Janeiro and New York City, 23 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 71
(1996).
4. See infra notes 39-41.
5. My thanks to Claúdio Napoleão, community leader and mediator in the
Cantagalo community in Rio de Janeiro, who expressed the demand for a social price
during a roundtable discussion at Fundação Getulio Vargas on July 14, 2010.
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idea of social rates, explicit in Brazil and implicit in the U.S., has
not been identified as a means to promote the right to the city, my
contention is that de facto social pricing for local taxes, water and
energy are in fact a limited expression of the struggle for participation and against segregation that is captured by Lefebvre’s
phrase.

II.

CONCEPTIONS OF THE RIGHT
BRAZILIAN LAW

TO THE

CITY

AND

The 1988 democratic Brazilian constitution, like many modern constitutions in Latin America and elsewhere,6 incorporates a
range of social and economic rights, and in that context, also
adopts a modern view of individual property rights as less than
absolute, balanced and limited by the social uses of land.7 This
conception of property rights was a partial victory for the “right to
the city” movement, some of whose demands are incorporated in
the proposed World Charter on the Right to the City.8 The movement emerged from the urban social revolts of the 1960s and
1970s, and the anti-globalization groups that came together in the
World Social Forum first held in Porto Alegre Brazil in 2001.9
New Left French philosopher Henri Lefebvre first elaborated
the concept of the right to the city in Le Droit a La Ville (1968)10,
6. LAW AND RIGHTS: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
GOVERNANCE, (Penelope Andrews & Susan Bazilli, ed. 2010); Carmen G. Gonzalez,
Squatters, Pirates and Entrepreneurs: Is Informality the Solution to the Urban
Housing Crisis?, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 239, 255-56 (2009).
7. The Constitution of Brazil, Article 5, enumerates fundamental individual and
collective rights and duties and includes the following references to property rights:
XXII - the right of property is guaranteed;
XXIII - property shall fulfill its social function;
XXIV - the law shall establish the procedure for expropriation for public necessity
or use, or for social interest, with fair and previous pecuniary compensation, except
for the cases provided in this Constitution. (English translation of Brazil 1988
Constitution with amendments through 1996, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/
Constitutions/Brazil/english96.html#mozTocId89810).
8. The Charter was drafted by various NGOs and social movements participating
in the 2004 World Social Forum in Barcelona Spain and is available at: http://www.
dpi.org/files/uploads/publications/WorldCharterontheRighttotheCity-October04.doc.
See UN HABITAT, Bridging the Urban Divide, Right to the City (2010) www.
unhabitat.org/documents/SOWC10/R12.pdf; Mark Purcell Citizenship and the Right
to the Global City: Reimagining the Capitalist World Order, 27 INT’L J. OF URBAN AND
REGIONAL RES. 564 (2003).
9. Margit Mayer, The ‘Right to the City’ in the Context of Shifting Mottos of Urban
Social Movements,13 CITY 362 (2009).
10. The only English translation appears in HENRI LEFEBVRE, WRITINGS ON CITIES
(Eleonore Kofman & Elizabeth Lebas trans. 1996).
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and returned to the theme in several later works, through and
including La Production de L’Espace (1974).11 Lefebvre conceived
the right as directly opposing the right to private property.12
Where property is the right to exclude and the right to appropriate exchange value, the right to the city includes the right of all
citizens to the “use-value” of space for their needs, for housing, for
play, for festivals, and, crucially, for social interchange.13 The
right also includes the right to break free from the control of
urban spaces exerted by capitalism’s imperatives. For Lefebvre,
the right to the city was a continual and revolutionary popular
demand.14 The adoption of Lefebvre’s phrase by the modern antiglobalization movement and urban reformers has arguably transformed the idea from a critical or revolutionary agenda to one of
participatory democratic reform and a rights-oriented set of
demands for housing and other social needs.15
The right to the city is first the right to the city center, a privileged place.16 The city center in Lefebvre’s conceptualization functions as a commons, a place for social and economic interaction,
for encountering human differences, and for combating spatial
and social exclusion or marginalization.17 The right to the city is
not the same as the right to live in the city, but the first implies
the second, since Lefebvre grounds the right to participate in
being a resident of the city. Thus, the right to use the spaces of
the city necessarily implies a right to housing, a right necessarily
in contradiction to antecedent property rights.
The second key element is that the right to the city privileges
use value over exchange (market) value, i.e. it disfavors absentee
ownership, speculation, and opposes the center as place of encoun11. HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE (Donald Nicholson-Smith trans.
1991).
12. For an excellent summary of Lefebvre’s conception and the international right
to the city movement inspired by it, see Ngai Pindell, Finding a Right to the City:
Exploring Property and Community in Brazil and in the United States, 39 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 435 (2006).
13. Id. at 440-45.
14. See generally LEFEBVRE, supra note 11.
15. Marcelo Lopes de Souza, Which right to Which City? In Defense of Political
Strategic Clarity, 2 Interface 315 (2010), available at http://housingstruggles.
wordpress.com/2010/06/06/interfacedebating-david-harvey/. See also Marcelo Lopes
de Souza, The Brazilian way of conquering the ‘right to the city’: successes and
obstacles in the long stride towards an ‘urban reform,’ 147 DISP 25 (2001), available
at www.nsl.ethz.ch/index.php/en/content/download/386/2471/file/.
16. LEFEBVRE, supra note 10, at 34.
17. Id. at 158-59.
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ter to the center as place of consumption.18 For residential space,
it would clearly imply a right to remain in one’s home without
regard to market forces driving out lower-income residents, i.e.,
speculation and gentrification.19
While the real-world challenges of restraining the market
pricing of land itself and the resulting pressure to remove poor
residents from central areas are daunting, a partial realization of
the right to the city can occur through non-market pricing
schemes for city services. The struggle for the right to the city
expresses itself through resistance to market imperatives and
demands for social rates. My contention is that these non-market
social pricing schemes, sometimes called “social rates” or “social
tariffs,” exist widely in the United States and Brazil, although the
dominant market ideology of the U.S. prevents any open acknowledgment of the practice. Social pricing of the city is nevertheless a
key necessary condition to the sustainable inclusion of the poor
and working class in urban life.
The third evolved meaning of the right to the city is a democratic right of decision making. City residents must be the makers
of the city’s structures and spaces, as they quite literally are in
Rio’s favelas, but residents must also be active participants in
urban planning, as exemplified by Porto Alegre’s pioneering use of
participatory budgeting.20 With regard to the pricing of city services, this clearly implies both a right of city residents to decide
social rate policies without interference from other levels of government, and a necessity of full public participation in rate decisions of both public and privatized city service providers like
water and sanitation companies.
The right to housing, conceived as part of the right to the city,
necessarily requires state action to counteract market forces, if it
is to be inclusionary. To have decent housing, poor city residents
must be protected from eviction and have access to basic city services including at a bare minimum police protection, transport,
water, and sanitation.21 These services, ordinarily funded through
property taxes and service rates or fees, can serve as an exclusionary force if they are not affordable to the poor. Any urban program
18. Id. at 100-02, 109, 123-24, 126-20, 131-32, 170.
19. Id. at 41-42 (Kofman & Lebes introduction).
20. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre:
Towards a Redistributive Democracy, 26 POLITICS & SOCIETY 461 (1998).
21. Alison Brown & Annali Kristiansen, Urban Policies and the Right to the City:
Rights, Responsibilities and Citizenship (2009), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/
0017/001780/178090e.pdf.
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that takes the right to the city seriously must tackle not only the
inevitable market pressures that drive home prices and rents out
of the reach of the poor, but also the explicit price of the city, in the
form of taxes and utility rates.
In Brazil, the idea of the right to the city translated into legal
terms has meant primarily the right to housing and the right to
political participation in city planning.22 Brazil’s 1988 Constitution and its 2001 City Statute23 explicitly adopt the concept of a
right to the city.24 The Constitution provides:
The urban development policy carried out by the municipal
government . . . is aimed at ordaining the full development
of the social functions of the city and ensuring the wellbeing of its inhabitants. . . . Urban property performs its
social function when it meets the fundamental requirements for the ordainment of the city as set forth in the
master plan.25
The 1988 Constitution embodies Brazil’s transition from the military dictatorship of the 1960s and 1970s to a democratic state.26
While the idea that property has a social function is not new,27 the
1988 Constitution follows a trend in late twentieth-century international constitutionalism, incorporating social and economic
rights in its catalog of fundamental human rights.28 On the other
hand, the 1988 Brazilian Constitution exists within the context of
Latin American constitutional traditions, in which sweeping declarations of human rights and limits on government are evaded if
not entirely ignored, and constitutions are rewritten with every
regime change.29
22. Edesio Fernandes, Constructing the Right to the City in Brazil, 16 SOCIAL &
LEGAL STUDIES 201, 211 (2007).
23. Federal Law no. 10.257 (Brazil July 10, 2001)(hereinafter “City Statute”).
24. Anna Plyushteva, The Right To The City and the Struggles Over Public
Citizenship: Exploring the Links, THE URBAN REINVENTORS ONLINE JOURNAL, (March
2009); Mark Purcell, Excavating Lefevbre: The Right to the City and its Urban Politics
of the Inhabitant, 58 GEOJOURNAL 99 (2002).
25. CONSTITUIÇÂO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 182 (Braz. 1988).
26. See CHARLES D. COLE, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: BRAZIL AND THE
UNITED STATES 30-32 (2008).
27. Sheila Foster and Daniel Bonilla, The Social Function of Property: A
Comparative Law Perspective, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 101 (2011); Colin Crawford, The
Social Function of Property and the Human Capacity to Flourish, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
1089 (2011).
28. E.g. Brazilian Constitution Article 6, guaranteeing rights to education, health,
work, housing, and assistance to the destitute, among others. [reprinted in Cole
supra note 266, at 515].
29. See Miguel Schor, Constitutionalism Through the Looking Glass of Latin
America, 41 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 1, 27-30 (2006).

R
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The constitutional provisions nevertheless represent a striking example of the adoption of the idea, also expressed in the proposed World Charter of the Right to the City.30 The 1988
Constitution reaffirms the right to private property,31 but simultaneously requires that property should fulfill its social and environmental functions.32 In one concrete expression of the right to the
city, the Constitution provides for reassignment of property rights
to residential occupants of small city lots through an accelerated
five-year adverse possession of private land scheme (usucapião),
or through assignment of use rights to public land.33 The 2001
City Statute makes specific provision for measures to prevent
speculation, including progressive taxation increases and eventual expropriation of land left vacant.34 The Statute provides for
the means to obtain freehold ownership by adverse possession
after five years,35 but also authorizes other possible forms of property transfer and tenure, including adverse possession for collective ownership (usucapião especial urbano coletivo).36
The ideals of the Brazilian Constitution and City Statute,
while animating a redirection in urban policy and a number of
important initiatives, are far from displacing traditional conceptions of property and land use favoring elites and speculators.
Likewise, the question of how the exclusion and segregation of the
poor and working class residents in Rio and other Brazilian cities
is to be addressed requires attention to the action of market forces
on many levels, not the least of which is the question of a social
price for city services.

III. SOCIAL PRICE OF PROPERTY TAX AND WATER AND
ENERGY RATES IN BRAZIL’S INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS
Throughout Latin America urbanization in the twentieth century has been driven in significant part by informal land occupation and construction by poor and working class citizens, who face
the complete inability of either the private housing market or gov30. Fernandes, supra note 22, at 201-211; Brown & Kristiansen, supra note 21.
31. CONSTITUIÇÂO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5, ¶ XXII (Braz.).
32. Id. at art. 5, ¶ XXIII.
33. Id. at art. 182.
34. Law no. 10.257, de 10 de julio de 2001, D.J.U. de 2002 [hereinafter City
Statute], Art. 7, 8.
35. City Statute, Art. 9.
36. City Statute, Art. 10-14; Rose Compans, A Regularizac?ão Fundiária de
Favelas no Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Revista Rio de Janeiro, no. 9, 41, 50-51 (jan./abr.
2003.)
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ernments to provide adequate housing and living space.37 In Rio
de Janeiro in 2000, more than one million people, or about 19% of
the population, lived in informal settlements, i.e. favelas.38 If illegal subdivisions built by developers are included, some estimates
put the number of urban residents throughout Brazil relying on
informal housing processes as high as 50%.39 One could argue that
occupants of informal settlements are struggling for Lefebvre’s
right to the city in the most concrete fashion, occupying and developing urban spaces to meet their needs for access to housing, education, employment and human progress.
Prior to the 1980s the Brazilian legal and political response to
favelas was largely to ignore them or to eradicate them.40 In the
1980s the government of Rio de Janeiro began providing water
and other services to the favelas.41 Since the 1980s, and particularly after the enactment of the 2001 City Statute, Rio and other
Brazilian cities have devoted considerable resources to the provision of municipal services, legalization of property titles, and
broader incorporation of favelas (as well as other irregular developments) into the city.42 The Favela Bairro program launched in
1993 by the Rio municipal government, with funding from the
Inter-American Development Bank, sought to incorporate the
favelas into the city with extension of infrastructure and public
spaces and the regularization of property ownership.43 However,
the resources devoted to the task have fallen fall short of the need,
37. Martim O. Smolka & Adriana de A. Larangeira, Informality and Poverty in
Latin American Urban Policies, in THE NEW GLOBAL FRONTIER: URBANIZATION,
POVERTY AND ENVIRONMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 99-114 (George Martine, et. al. eds.
2008).
38. Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP) Brazil, How do the
Peri-Urban Poor Meet their Energy Needs: a Case Study of Caju Shantytown, Rio de
Janeiro 16 (2006) avail. at http://vle.worldbank.org/bnpp/files/TF027963ESMA09406
BrazilStudyForWeb.pdf.
39. Fernandes, supra note 22.
40. Oliveira, supra note 3, at 75; Fabio Soares & Yuri Soares, The Socio-Economic
Impact of Favela-Bairro: What do the Data Say? (IADB Working Paper August 2005),
http://ideas.repec.org/p/idb/ovewps/0805.html.
41. Soares & Soares, supra note 40, at 4.
42. Fernandes, supra note 22; Ministerio das Cidades (Brazil Ministry of Cities),
Regularizac?ao Fundiária Urbana No Brasil (Urban Land Regularization in Brazil)
(2009) (summarizing efforts to legalize titles and provides services in informal
settlements).
43. Sonia Rabello de Castro, Favela Bairro: A Brief Institutional Analysis of the
Programmme and its Land Aspects, in HOLDING THEIR GROUND: SECURE LAND
TENURE FOR THE URBAN POOR IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Alain Durand-Lasserve &
Lauren Royston, ed. 2002).
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and the continuing growth of the settlements.44 In theory, municipalities should recover some costs of providing infrastructure and
doing the legal work necessary for securing housing tenure, by collecting increased property taxes as a result of the added value created by these improvements. The extremely slow process of land
titling in practice has limited the extent to which informal settlements have been incorporated into the property tax and water
ratepaying base.45
Nevertheless, the prospect of urban integration and land
titling inevitably threatens poor residents with market-driven displacement resulting from the combination of property tax payments, utility rates and upward pressure on housing prices and
rents.46 In one Rio settlement, the granting of freehold titles
caused home prices to double.47
Several legal tools allow Brazilian cities to maintain some
control over property price increases resulting form titling of
informal settlements, thus allowing low-income residents to be
somewhat protected from excessive property taxes. Municipal
zoning can designate special areas of social interest (“AEISs”) to
prevent the purchase and sale of private land occupied by improvised housing.48 This zoning designation by its very nature prevents the development of a private market for the purchase and
sale of the affected areas, particularly for speculative purposes.
Brazilian municipalities can also make use of a form of leasehold of public land that does not grant full freehold title. Known
as a Concession of the Real Right to Use (CRRU), these are usually long-term contracts for occupancy, that can be inherited, but
require continued residency and restrict resale.49 In some cases,
inter vivos sales are prohibited, and in other cities resales require
44. Id.; Soares & Soares, supra note 40.
45. Fernandes, supra note 2, at 31-34 (2011).
46. Alain Durand-Lasserve, Market-driven Evictions and Displacements:
Implications for the Perpetuation of Informal Settlements in Developing Cities, in
INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS: A PERPETUAL CHALLENGE? (M. Huchzermeyer & A. Karam,
ed. 2006).
47. ENERGY SECTOR MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (ESMAP), HOW DO THE
PERI-URBAN POOR MEET THEIR ENERGY NEEDS: A CASE STUDY OF CAJU SHANTYTOWN,
RIO DE JANEIRO 23, (World Energy Council 2006), http://vle.worldbank.org/bnpp/files/
TF027963ESMA09406BrazilStudyForWeb.pdf
48. Adriana Larangeira, La Gestion de la Informalidad en Rio de Janeiro y Brazil,
CUADERNO URBANO 187, 208-09 (June 2006); Edesio Fernandes, Combining Tenure
Policies, Urban Planning and City Management in Brazil, in LAND, RIGHTS &
INNOVATION 209, 216-17 (Geoffrey Payne, ed. 2002).
49. Fernandes, supra note 48, at 215.
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approval by local authorities.50 Sometimes CRRU tenants are
required to pay property tax while in other cities they are exempt.
In one AEIS where titling has occurred using the CRRU form of
tenure, a market exists but land prices—and hence taxes—have
remained low. Thus, the CRRU represents an alternative form of
property rights that could, theoretically, reduce exclusion by holding down the price of the city. On the other hand, favela residents
may not be satisfied with the restricted title that the CRRU represents. In Recife a favela community known as Brasilia Teimosa
resisted offers of legalization via CRRU titles and organized to
demand full freehold ownership.51
Some empirical indication of the price of the Brazilian city
comes from the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatı́stica’s
2002-2003 survey of consumer expenditures.52 The median urban
household was found to spend R$573 on housing, including R$266
for rent and R$152, or about US$90, for services and taxes.53 The
amounts spent for city taxes and services loom large for the majority of residents in informal settlements. About half of favela
residents earn less than the monthly minimum wage (about
R$450 monthly or US$265), and about a quarter earns less than
half the minimum.54 For poor urban residents, services and taxes
could amount to half of their monthly income or more.
By 2004, 86% of favela residents considered themselves homeowners, but virtually none had legal title.55 In 1969 only one-third
of residents in Rio’s favelas and housing projects had running
water, while by 2001 access to running water was nearly universal.56 Similarly in 1969 fewer than one-half of households had electricity of any kind, and most electricity was illegally resold by
community organizations. In 2001 electricity service was also
nearly universal. The electric utility company (Light) was privatized in 1996, and chose to treat favela residents as customers
50. Id.
51. Id. at 225.
52. INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATÍSTICA (IBGE), CONSUMER
EXPENDITURE SURVEY POF 2002-2003 (2003), Tabela 4.3 - Despesas monetária e nãomonetária média mensal familiar da área urbana. http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/
estatistica/populacao/condicaodevida/pof/2002/default.shtm.
53. Id.
54. ESMAP, supra note 47.
55. Janice Perlman, Marginality: From Myth to Reality in the Favelas of Rio de
Janeiro, 1969–2002, in URBAN INFORMALITY IN AN ERA OF LIBERALIZATION: A
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, at 28 (Ananya Roy and Nezar AlSayyad, ed. 2004).
56. Id.
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rather than outlaws.57
Titling and legalization of informal settlements, while clearly
distinct processes,58 simultaneously offer new stability and new
risks.59 With legalization comes the obligation to pay for city services that poor residents previously did without or, alternatively,
obtained without payment. With incorporation into the legal city,
and especially with titling, comes the requirement to pay local
property and business taxes as well as utility payments, in some
cases driving residents out of their homes.60
Favela residents, or at least, resident organizations, have
expressed a strong desire to obtain freehold titles to their homes.
In Rio, payment of the property tax (IPTU, for impuesto sobre a
propriedade predial e territorial urbana) is dependent on title regularization, and for that reason poor residents profess a strong
desire to pay their property tax.61 With an IPTU bill comes recognition as a “gente”, a citizen and not a slum-dweller. On the other
hand, like any property tax, IPTU is only related to income to the
extent that land values are related to income. Particularly in
informal settlements bordering on high-value neighborhoods, the
possibility that tax assessments, and therefore IPTU bills, will
make housing unaffordable is very real.
Rio de Janeiro’s IPTU legislation provides exemptions for the
physically disabled, World War II veterans, and elderly persons
above sixty years of age earning up to two minimum salaries, a
level considerably above the poverty line.62 There is also a provisional exemption related to titling of informal settlements. That
exemption is temporary, only from the time parcels in irregular or
57. Id. at 42, n. 60.
58. Nora Aristizabal & Andres Ortiz Gomez. Are Services More Important than
Titles in Bogota? in LAND, RIGHTS AND INNOVATION: IMPROVING TENURE SECURITY FOR
THE URBAN POOR (G. Payne, ed. 2002).
59. Bernadette Atuahene, Land Titling: A Mode of Privatization with the
Potential to Deepen Democracy, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 761 (2005-06); see Gonzalez,
supra note 6.
60. MIKE DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS 80-81 (2006); see Fernandes, supra note 48.
61. Erico Costa, Interview with Joze Candido de Lacerda, VITRUVIUS MAGAZINE,
July 2004, http://www.vitruvius.com.br/revistas/read/entrevista/05.019/3326; see
Gonzalez, supra note 6, at 245 (being billed for taxes and utilities is relied on by
residents without title as a sign of tenure security).
62. Prefecture of Rio de Janeiro. Código Tributário Do Municı́pio Do Rio De
Janeiro Seção II, Art. 61. Das Isenções, Cartilha dos Impostos Municipais: IPTU Imposto sobre a Propriedade Predial e Territorial Urbana (Tax Code of Municipality
of Rio De Janeiro, Section II Article 61 Exemptions from Municipal Taxes )(accessed
1/4/2011), http://www2.rio.rj.gov.br/smf/pagsmf/conteudo.cfm?template=conteudo&
idmenu=3&idsubitem=128+&procura=IPTU++Imposto+sobre+a+Propriedade+
Predial+e+Territorial+Urbana.
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illegal settlements are registered with the local government
agency until the property and subdivision are approved, and only
for acquirers of for low-income persons in designated sections of
Rio, occupying the land as a family residence and not owning or
purchasing any other property.63 Other Brazilian cities have provided one-year exemptions from property taxes for newly titled
informal settlements.64 After any initial exemption period, IPTU is
assessed based on property value. While other measures, including AEIS zoning and less-than-freehold titling, might restrain the
value and hence the amount of the IPTU, the limited exemptions
mean that low-income property owners are not explicitly protected
from unaffordable taxes.
Social tariffs are widely practiced by Brazilian electric utilities, and have also existed for some time for water and sewer
rates.65 Social prices for utility rates, i.e. reduced rates for lowincome customers have been adopted by electric utilities in order
to reduce illegal usage and resale.66 In Rio the public water and
sewer utility, CEDAE, has established social rates, i.e., reduced
rates based on income for more than one million customers, in recognition of the fact that a paying customer—even one paying
below cost rates—is better than the alternative, residents appropriating water from the network without payment, or paying high
costs to informal water suppliers.67 However, the social water rate
is based on the questionable assumption that poor households will
consume less water than average, and its benefits are restricted to
customers using less than 200 liters per day. Nor is the CEDAE
discount rate limited to the poor; households with incomes of up to
five times the minimum salary are eligible.68
63. Id.
64. Ministerio das Cidades (Brazil Ministry of Cities), Regularizac?ao Fundiária
Urbana No Brasil (Urban Land Regularization in Brazil) 68, 93 (2009).
65. Carlos Eduardo Lima Passos, Consumo de água e tarifa social em áreas de
baixa renda: Estudo de caso das Comunidades de Santa Marta, Complexo do Borel/
Casa Branca e Complexo da Mangueira, Rio de Janeiro 95 (unpublished dissertation
State University of Rio de Janeiro 2010) http://www.peamb.eng.uerj.br/producao.php?
id=268; Luisa M. Mimmi & Spencer Ecer, An Econometric Study of Illegal Electricity
Connections in the Urban Favelas of Belo Horizonte, Brazil 38 ENERGY POLICY 5081
(2010); see Gonzalez, supra note 6, at 247 (describing social rates for taxes and
utilities in Bogota Colombia).
66. Bruno de Wachter & Clothilde Wattel, Safe electricity for slum residents A
pilot project in Paraisópolis, São Paulo, Brazil (2007) http://www.leonardo-energy.org/
webfm_send/399.
67. CEDAE, Balanco Social Anual 2010, www.cedae.com.br/div/Balancos/
BalancoSocial2010.pdf.
68. Federação de Favelas Do Rio De Janeiro (FAFERJ), Baixa Renda-Saiba Mais.
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Many other examples could be cited. While some measures
exist to align IPTU and utility rates with ability to pay, Brazil
does not yet seem to have a comprehensive social tax and rate system, intentionally calibrated to secure housing tenure for the
poorest residents of informal settlements. Nor do these partial
measures seem grounded in a constitutional theory of the right to
the city. Instead, ad hoc social pricing schemes exist within the
dominant market pricing structure, in which land tax is based on
the exchange value of real estate and utility rates are based on
marginal cost plus profit.69

IV. SOCIAL RATES

IN

U.S. CITIES

The idea of a right to the city in today’s United States might
seem more than a little odd. Unlike the city of Europe and Latin
America, for many older U.S. cities, the center is not the locus of
speculation, competition and high economic demand for land or
housing. Instead, industrial jobs and middle class families have
been decentralized to the suburbs, leaving the poor to occupy the
older housing of the jobless city centers.70 Lefebvre’s notion that
the struggle for the city is a defining one seems culturally irrelevant to the economic and political geography of the U.S. Lefebvre
himself recognized that “in the United States, the urban core
hardly exists.”71
On the other hand, U.S. cities have certainly witnessed political struggles over gentrification and displacement of the poor.72
The Occupy Wall Street movement of 2011 consisted of physical
encampments by protesters in city centers, spreading from downtown Manhattan to hundreds of other cities.73 This movement
struggled literally for the right to city space in order to confront
the wealthy and powerful,74 the “New Masters” in Lefebvre’s “cen(Blog post April 14, 2008) http://faferj.blogspot.com/2008/04/baixa-renda-saiba-mias.
html.
69. See Ioannis N. Kessides, Reforming Infrastructure: Privatization, Regulation
and Competition 269-274 (World Bank Policy Research Report) 28985 (2004).
70. See Anthony Downs, How American Cities are Growing, 16 BROOKINGS REV. 8
(1998); PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS AND THE
AMERICAN CITY (1997).
71. LEFEBVRE, supra note 10, at 125.
72. Chester Hartman, The Right to Stay Put, in GENTRIFICATION READER (Loretta
Lees, Tom Slater & Elvin Wyly, ed. 2010).
73. Neal Caren & Sarah Gaby, Occupy Online: Facebook and the Spread of Occupy
Wall Street (2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1943168.
74. Alasdair S. Roberts, Containing the Outrage: How Police Power Tames the
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tres of decision.”75
There is no equivalent to the right to the city (or the social
function of property) in United States constitutional law. Judicial
elaboration of a social right to housing remains highly controversial, and vigorously contested by advocates of the neoliberal conception of negative rights and untrammeled markets as the
providers of human wants and needs.76 Nor has legislation sought
to protect poor urban residents from displacement by market
forces, apart from some legal mandates to prevent or remedy
racial segregation and exclusion in housing, and thus implicitly
granting some rights of urban access for racial minorities, but not
for low-income residents per se.77 The right to the city movement
has a presence in the United States, in the form of the Right to the
City Alliance, growing largely out of anti-globalization struggles of
various grass-roots groups.78 Their activism has been directed at
gentrification, preservation of public housing threatened with
demolition, and police activity excluding the poor and homeless
from urban centers.79 While the right to the city movement, as
such, has not produced national legal recognition equivalent to
Brazil’s City statute, nevertheless a variety of laws and practices
echo the demands of a broader movement against exclusion.
In U.S. practice, a variety of subsidies and concessions exist
that tend to preserve some affordability of cities, albeit for the
most part benefitting homeowners rather than renters. These ad
hoc social pricing devices exist in considerable conflict with the
prevailing neoliberal theories of taxing and pricing.

A.

City Real Estate Taxes

The predominant theoretical view of local government taxation in the United States regards the local property tax as a price
Occupy Movement BOSTON REVIEW (on-line only 2011), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1959542.
75. LEFEBVRE, supra note 10, at 161.
76. Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 TEX. L.
REV. 1895 (2003); Peter Salins, Comment on Chester Hartman’s ‘‘The Case for a Right
to Housing’’: Housing Is a Right? Wrong!, 9 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 259 (1998).
77. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601; Housing and Community
Development Act 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5309; see Kennedy v. City of Zanesville Ohio, 505
F.Supp. 2d 456 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (involving local government’s failure to supply water
service to African-American neighborhood challenged under civil rights laws).
78. Harmony Goldberg, Building Power in the City: Reflections on the Emergence
of the Right to the City Alliance and the National Domestic Worker’s Alliance (2008),
http://inthemiddleofthewhirlwind.wordpress.com/building-power-in-the-city.
79. Id.
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for the public goods and services provided by local governments.
The objective of taxation, according to this view, is to set a tax
level sufficient to pay the cost of the “optimal” quantity and quality of government services, with the taxpayer understood as consumers of those services.80 In this abstracted neoclassical
economics model, citizens are imagined as rational optimizers who
choose where they live by seeking the highest level of services they
desire (education, police protection, transportation, etc.) combined
with the lowest tax rates.81 This conception, known as the Tiebout
model of local taxation, assumes away all problems of income inequality, or at least fails to consider them, and is completely indifferent to any notion of urban identity, cultural attachment or
social dynamics in the creation and composition of the city.82 In a
nation divided by race and class, the Tiebout sorting of citizens
based on local taxation levels has produced segregation such that
the affluent can enjoy both high levels of service and low tax
rates.83
Competing with the market price theory of local taxation, so
to speak, is the view that taxation generally, and municipal taxation in particular, should be based on ability to pay.84 In U.S. tax
policy discussions there is a continuing and lively debate between
advocates of so-called “benefits taxation,” i.e., the Tiebout
approach that taxes according to benefits received to mimic market pricing, and advocates of progressive taxation based on either
ability to pay or equalizing sacrifice.85 The ability to pay approach
80. William A. Fischel, Municipal Corporations, Homeowners and the Benefit View
of the Property Tax, in PROPERTY TAXATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE
(Wallace Oates, ed. 2001); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,
64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
81. Id.
82. See Richard Voith, Central City Decline, Regional or Neighborhood Solutions,
BUSINESS REVIEW (March-April 1996), http://www.phil.frb.org/research-and-data/
publications/business-review/1996/march-april/center-city.cfm; see also Carl Davis et.
al., Who Pays? A Distributional Analysis of the Tax Systems in All 50 States, at 9-10
(3rd Edition 2009), www.itepnet.org/whopays3.pdf.
83. Voith, supra note 82; Swanstrom, et. al., PULLING APART, ECONOMIC
SEGREGATION AMONG SUBURBS AND CENTRAL CITIES IN MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS
(Brookings Institute 2004), http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2004/10metropolitan
policy_swanstrom.aspx.
84. See generally Marjorie Kornhauser, Equality, Liberty and a Fair Income Tax,
23 FORDHAM URBAN L. J. 607, 615-20 (1995); Alfred G. Buehler, Ability to Pay, 1.
N.Y.U. TAX L. REV. 243 (1946); M. Slade Kendrick, The Ability-to-Pay Theory of
Taxation, 29 AM. ECON. REV. 92 (1939) (arguing against the ability to pay theory).
85. See Richard A. Musgrave, Progressive Taxation, Equity and Tax Design, in
TAX PROGRESSIVITY AND INCOME INEQUALITY (Joel Slemrod ed., 1994).
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sometimes is dictated by facts on the ground, i.e., that ignoring
income differences could lead to nonpayment and tax revolts.
Americans living in central cities spent an average of $1,305
annually for property taxes in 2008, with an average annual
income of $55,385.86 The average annual water bill was $455 and
the average annual electric bill was $1,169.87 For those with
incomes below the U.S. minimum wage, roughly $15,000 per
annum, the average annual property tax for homeowners ranged
from $424 to $727, with water bills ranging from $239 to $325 and
electricity from $824 to $1104 annually.88 A full-time minimum
wage worker thus spent roughly 4% of income on property taxes,
2% for water bills and 7% for electricity. While these averages
suggest affordability is not a major concern, the national averages
mask wide variations, and the urban poor in more expensive
coastal cities, including New York, Washington D.C. and Los
Angeles, face much higher costs, which can result in very real economic displacement pressure.89
Income-based property tax reduction programs exist in some
form in most U.S. states and in the District of Columbia.90 Most of
these were adopted in the 1960s and 1970s in response to rapid
inflation in home prices, combined with assessment reform that
ended the practice whereby local government tax officials set taxable property values at a fraction of real market value.91 These two
developments led to significant and unexpected increases in property tax bills, which in turn sparked social protests.92 The protests
were mostly by middle class and more affluent property owners.
Indeed, fractional assessment practices eliminated by assessment
reform had tended to benefit the middle class and disfavor the
poor and racial minorities in cities, because the latter paid higher
86. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CONSUMER EXPENDITURE SURVEY, TABLE 7
(2009), available at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/ce/standard/2009/tenure.txt.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See FURMAN CENTER, DISTRIBUTION OF THE BURDEN OF NEW YORK CITY’S
PROPERTY TAX, 2011, http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/Distribution_of_the_
Burden_of_New_York_Citys_Property_Tax_11.pdf (noting unequal incidence of New
York City property taxes on poor renters); Micah Lemons, Note: Circuit Breakers:
Implementing a Property Tax Credit to Help Low-Income Households, 19 GEO. J.
POVERTY LAW & POL’Y 111 (2012).
90. Steven D. Gold, Circuit Breakers and Other Relief Measures, in THE PROPERTY
TAX AND LOCAL FINANCE (C. Lowell Harriss ed., 2006); GLENN W. FISHER, THE WORST
TAX? A HISTORY OF THE PROPERTY TAX IN AMERICA, 193-94 (1996).
91. ISAAC WILLIAM MARTIN, THE PERMANENT TAX REVOLT: HOW THE PROPERTY TAX
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN POLITICS 50-57 (2008).
92. Id.; Steven D. Gold, supra note 90, at 150-52.
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effective property tax rates, and would have benefitted from
assessment reform.93 So-called circuit breakers, i.e., rebates of
local property taxes from state revenues targeted at low-income
homeowners, were the response from the political left, while
across the board tax caps like California’s Proposition 13 were the
response from the right.94
In most states, however, the social rates or rebate programs
are offered only to the elderly poor, or to other preferred groups
among the poor, such as veterans or the disabled. As of 2008, 33
states provided income-based property tax reduction, but only 12
states plus the District of Columbia offer property tax relief to
non-elderly poor.95 Thus, when we talk about social rates for property taxes in the U.S., these rates are often available only for the
elderly, and in some cases disabled, excluding working-age, poor
families. Income-based property tax reduction programs are sometimes called “circuit breakers,” although this term does not have a
generally accepted definition.96 I will continue to refer to incomebased rebate programs, or social property tax rates.
Social property tax rate programs vary in their design and
delivery.97 They do not target cities exclusively or particularly,
although higher property values in cities mean that city residents
are more likely to benefit from them. Some states establish a simple percentage-of-income threshold, such as 5%. They then either
cap property taxes at that level or provide a rebate payment or
income tax credit for property tax payments exceeding the threshold percentage.98 Other states provide multiple income percentage
thresholds, increasing progressively with income. Some states
also exclude taxpayers above a maximum income, which can be
quite low, often at or near the poverty level in some states.
Another common variant is to make rebate payments based on
93. GEORGE E. PETERSON, ET. AL., PROPERTY TAXES, HOUSING AND THE CITIES
(1973) (study finding that real estate tax assessment practices resulted in crosssubsidies from poor and minority owners and renters to middle class suburbanites
and calling for assessment reform).
94. MARTIN, supra note 91, at 88-93.
95. JOHN H. BOWMAN, DAPHNE A. KENYON, ADAM LANGLEY, & BETHANY P. PAQUIN,
PROPERTY TAX CIRCUIT BREAKERS: FAIR AND COST-EFFECTIVE RELIEF FOR TAXPAYERS
(Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 2009), available at https://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/
dl/1569_838_Property%20Tax%20Circuit%20Breakers%20Final.pdf.
96. See Gold, supra note 90.
97. NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, FORECLOSURES (2009 supplement); KAREN
LYONS, SARAH FARKAS, & NICHOLAS JOHNSON, THE PROPERTY TAX CIRCUIT BREAKER:
AN INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY OF CURRENT PROGRAMS (Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities 2007).
98. LYONS ET. AL., supra note 97.
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income, without regard to the property tax burden. For example,
Iowa refunds 85% of property taxes paid to families earning less
than $10,000 annual income, and 35% of property taxes paid for
those earning less than $15,000.99 A few states limit property
taxes as a percentage of the home value, regardless of income, a
system that cannot really be included in the concept of social
rates.100
Local governments collect property taxes, but the social
rebate programs are administered and funded, with rare exceptions, by the states.101 Thus, these programs either redistribute
tax burdens from state-level income or sales taxes, or they result
in cross-subsidies from more affluent property tax payers to poor
or elderly property owners. In some states, there are many eligible property owners who do not receive the rebates, because the
rebate procedure is separate from the property tax collection process, and requires filing separate forms or claiming the rebate on a
state income tax return; consequently, many eligible taxpayers
fail to file the forms.102
The political origin of these social property tax rebate programs is relatively obvious. They are extremely popular with state
legislators and voters. Elderly homeowners on fixed incomes often
have sufficient political clout to persuade state lawmakers that
their property taxes, or the rate of increase in their taxes, are
unfair. Moreover, they are consistent with a neoliberal marketbased approach that regards property taxes as a form of price for
city services,103 set without regard to ability to pay, with a separate and distinct transfer payment, allowing the liberal state to
fulfill its part via a limited redistribution of income.
U.S. social property tax rebates are not motivated by any recognition of a right to the city for poor residents. Indeed, they have
been criticized for their failure to target the truly needy and their
redistribution in favor of middle class seniors.104 Nevertheless,
some cities have recognized that in addition to state-administered
tax rebate programs, the cities themselves must also address the
reality of unaffordable property taxes for their low-income
residents. The problem is especially salient for cities grappling
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 95; see also LYONS ET AL., supra note 97.
102. See BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 95.
103. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
104. Robert C. Christopherson, Missing The Forest For The Trees: The Illusory
Half-Policy Of Senior Citizen Property Tax Relief, 13 ELDER L. J. 195 (2005).
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with the problem of large uncollected delinquent property taxes.105
While some of these unpaid taxes are attributable to well-off scofflaws or speculators, often property tax delinquencies result
directly from the poverty of the homeowners, who are simply unable to meet their tax payment obligations.106 Cities have
responded, in some instances, with ad hoc programs to adjust
property tax delinquencies, or allow extended repayment, based
on social need. Chicago, for example, has a discretionary program
to abate property tax debts based on financial hardship.107 Philadelphia and other cities similarly offer discretionary tax forgiveness and payment plans for poor residents.108
Several cities, including Philadelphia, have sold delinquent
property tax claims to private collection firms at a discount, in
order to close municipal budget gaps.109 Because the private collectors are motivated solely by the goal of maximizing collections,
they are unlikely to be concerned about homeowners’ income or
ability to pay. In some cases, cities have had to negotiate protections for low-income residents to prevent home losses and displacement as a result of unaffordable property tax rates for the
poor. This was the experience in Philadelphia, where the city
sought to prevent displacement of poor homeowners by retaining
the right to repurchase tax debts on individual homes when
necessary.110

B.

Social Rates for Water and Energy Services

Neoliberal orthodoxy holds that all users of basic city services
such as water, sewer, solid waste removal, electricity and other
energy utilities should pay a market price in order to make these
105. Patrick Kerkstra, Special Report: The Delinquicy Crisis, PLANPHILLY, Aug. 13,
2011, http://planphilly.com/special-report-delinquency-crisis; Patrick Kerkstra, City’s
Tax Delinquency Epedimic Deepens, PLANPHILLY, June 9, 2012, http://planphilly.com/
citys-tax-delinquency-epidemic-deepens.
106. See PAUL WALDHART & ANDREW RESCHOVSKY, PROPERTY TAX DELINQUENCY
AND THE NUMBER OF PAYMENT INSTALLMENTS 11, 14 (2012) (finding that property tax
delinquencies may result from income constraints, and that billing for taxes more
frequently than once per year increases tax collections).
107. City of Chicago, Financial Hardship Application (2011), http://www.
cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/rev/provdrs/tax/svcs/apply_for_financialhardship.html.
108. News Release, City of Philadelphia (2011), available at https://ework.phila.
gov/philagov/news/prelease.asp?id=227; City of Washington, D.C. (2011), http://otr.
cfo.dc.gov/otr/cwp/view,a,1329,q,621148.asp; City of Indianapolis, http://www.indy.
gov/eGov/Mayor/Executive/Pages/2003_1.aspx.
109. Ben Hayllar, Philadelphia’s Tax Lien Sale and Securitization, 13 GOV. FIN.
REV. (1997).
110. Id.
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services economically viable and efficient, and to conserve
resources by discouraging overconsumption.111 United States public utility law directly incorporates this market logic, and calls for
price structures to be based on marginal cost.112 For electric utilities, Federal law, namely the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act of 1978 (“PURPA”), mandates cost-based pricing for all classes
of customers.113 On the other hand, PURPA requires electric utilities to determine whether to establish so-called “lifeline” rates,
i.e., rates that may be lower than those based on costs alone in
order to meet “essential needs” of customers.114 Thus even Congress simultaneously enacts market price into law but allows a
space for social price.
The market pricing of energy even in the U.S. is relatively
recent. From 1938 until 1989, for example, the Federal Power
Commission and its successor the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission regulated the price of natural gas.115 Deregulation of
gas prices took place in the historical moment when deregulation
generally was on the ascendancy, with concomitant deregulation
of airlines, banking, and other market sectors previously regarded
as utilities.116 In response to the price increases that followed deregulation, Congress enacted the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) to protect low-income consumers from
price increases with transfer payments to subsidize energy
purchases and to encourage weatherization and other energy-saving measures for low-income households.117
111. POVERTY IN FOCUS, EQUITABLE ACCESS TO BASIC UTILITIES: PUBLIC VERSUS
PRIVATE PROVISION AND BEYOND (Degol Hailu & Raquel Tsukada, eds. 2009), http://
www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCPovertyInFocus18.pdf; Karen Bakker, Neoliberalizing
Nature: Market Environmentalism in Water Supply in England and Wales, 95
ANNALS OF THE ASSOC. OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 542 (2005); WORLD BANK REFORMING
INFRASTRUCTURE: PRIVATIZATION, REGULATION, AND COMPETITION (2004).
112. CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 389-98 (1984).
113. 16 U.S.C. §1621(d)(1) provides:
Rates charged by any electric utility for providing electric service to
each class of electric consumers shall be designed, to the maximum
extent practicable, to reflect the costs of providing electric service to
such class, as determined under section 2625 (a) of this title.
114. 16. U.S.C. §1624.
115. Elizabeth Moler et. al., A Salute: 75 Years for the FPC and FERC, 16 ENERGY
L.J. 293, 294-96 (1995).
116. MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION (1985).
117. JULIE WHITTAKER & LIBBY PERL, LOW-INCOME HOME ENERGY ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM (LIHEAP) ALLOCATION RATES: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CURRENT LAW
(Congressional Research Service 2006), http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33275_
20060210.pdf.
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Water and sewer companies in the U.S., on the other hand,
are often still owned and operated by municipal governments, in
contrast with the widespread privatization of water service in the
developing world. The cost of water and sewer service rose rapidly
in the 1980s and 1990s, partly as a result of environmental
requirements.118 For the very poor and for residents whose income
is irregular, water rates can become unaffordable, and members of
these groups may face the threat of service termination or even
property seizure because of unpaid bills.119
Lifeline rates for water service tend to be ad hoc and vary
widely from city to city, although they are typically aimed at delinquent ratepayers, as an alternative to service termination. A
minority of U.S. cities and water utilities offer social rates or subsidy payments for poor customers.120 Baltimore, Maryland, for
example, offers a $125 credit and flexible repayment for lowincome property owners who have receive notice of a service shutoff or property seizure.121 Some cities, like San Antonio, Texas,122
San Francisco, California,123 and Columbus, Ohio,124 offer discounted rates for the poor. Other cities, including Houston, Texas,
offer financial assistance to pay water rates from privately
donated funds.125 The Philadelphia Water Department offers one
of the more comprehensive social rate programs, combining a percentage-of-income payment plan for customers in arrears with an
annual grant of $200, which is an explicit transfer payment from
other rate collections.126 California authorizes private water companies to provide rate relief for poor customers and a number of
118. See Water Infrastructure Network, Safe and Clean Water for the 21st
Century, at 3-5 (2000), http://www.win-water.org/reports/winreport2000.pdf (citing
rising percentage of families who face unaffordable water bills).
119. NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, ACCESS TO UTILITY SERVICE 301 (4th ed.
2008).
120. Id. at 220-36, 302-04.
121. CITY OF BALTIMORE, LOW INCOME WATER ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (2011), http://
www.baltimorecity.gov/Government/AgenciesDepartments/PublicWorks/LowIncome
WaterAssistanceProgram.aspx
122. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, RESIDENTIAL METER DISCOUNTS (2011), http://www.
saws.org/service/rates/resMeterDiscount.shtml.
123. CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO, SAN FRANCISCO WATER DISCOUNT PROGRAMS (2011),
http://www.sfgov.org/site/frame.asp?u=http://www.sfwater.org/.
124. CITY OF COLUMBUS, COLUMBUS, OHIO LOW-INCOME UTILITY PROGRAMS (2011),
http://utilities.columbus.gov/water/pdfs/LowIncome6-29-07.pdf.
125. CITY OF HOUSTON, WATER FUND (2011), http://www.publicworks.houstontx.
gov/resource/waterfund.html.
126. News Release, City of Philadelphia, https://ework.phila.gov/philagov/news/
prelease.asp?id=227; see also National Consumer Law Center, supra note 119, at 302.
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them have established reduced rates based on income.127
When North American water and energy utility companies
and regulators have sought to establish social rates for the poor
through administrative action, market advocates have occasionally gone to the courts to object. A considerable amount of litigation has been brought challenging the legitimacy and legality of
social rate schemes.128 While property rights theories are
advanced to oppose the appropriation of urban land to house the
poor, opponents of social pricing mobilize theories of nondiscrimination (state utility regulation statutes typically call for rates to
be nondiscriminatory),129 implicitly treating market (or monopoly)
pricing as the only natural and equitable basis to charge for
water, energy and other utility services.
In Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Utah Public Service
Commission,130 and other similar cases,131 courts have found that
establishing different prices for utility service based on income or
ability to pay violates broadly stated principles of equality or nondiscrimination. Relying on the principle that similarly situated
persons may not be charged dissimilar rates, these courts find
that differences in ability to pay are not an appropriate basis for
charging different rates. These decisions are imbued with the
neoliberal law-and-economics belief in the efficiency of market
pricing and the desirability of relegating income and wealth redistribution to income transfer programs.
On the other hand, other courts have upheld social rate programs against legal challenges,132 and income-based rates funded
by utilities, sometimes using explicit surcharges to other customers, are relatively common.133 Although utilities adopt social rates
partly for pragmatic reasons of reducing collection costs and writeoffs of uncollected arrearages,134 they are at least implicitly
acknowledging the contradiction between universal service and
cost-based pricing.
United States law is devoid of any recognition of a right to the
127. National Consumer Law Center, supra note 119, at 303.
128. Michael A. Rosenhouse, Public Utilities: Validity of Preferential Rates for
Elderly or Low-income Persons, 29 A.L.R. 615 (1988).
129. See Ind. Code §8-1-2-103 (1993).
130. 613 P. 2d 92 (N.M. 1984).
131. See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Found. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 590 P.2d 495
(Colo. 1979).
132. See Rosenhouse, supra note 128.
133. See Ken Costello, Criteria for Determining the Effectiveness of Utility-Initiated
Energy Assistance, 23 ELECTRICITY J. 35 (2010).
134. Id. at 43.
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city, or any positive right to housing, and social rates are not
enacted on the basis of rights arguments. In many cases measures
to consider repayment ability result from episodic political mobilization around rate hikes or displacement, combined with pragmatic concerns of municipal authorities anxious to preserve the
legitimacy of tax and rate collections and keep unpaid bills to a
reasonable level, and avoid the external costs of service terminations and evictions. Principles of universality of utility service and
consideration of ability to pay in local taxation also play a role.
Nevertheless, the wide variety of arrangements in the United
States and its cities to account for the payment ability of taxpayers and rate-payers reveal some of the same contradictions that
are expressed in social pricing elsewhere, and in the demand for
the right to the city.

V. CONCLUSION
The concept of the right to the city is foreign to United States
jurisprudence; likewise, the notion of social pricing is deeply contrary to the liberal market-driven economic consensus. Nevertheless, the practices of states and municipalities do reveal the
manner in which the struggle between market price and social
price has played out, perhaps in response to episodic and partial
political mobilizations. Social pricing exists, although its theoretical basis is poorly elaborated. In Brazil, the new Constitutional
and legislative norms embodying the right to the city have found
expression in efforts to break down the exclusion and isolation of
favelas and other informal settlements, albeit perhaps simply as a
new extension of the sovereignty of the capitalist state. If the market cycle of speculation and displacement is not to be repeated in
these self-created urban spaces, the right to the city for all must
necessarily imply the legitimacy of the demand for a social price.

